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Selected Work


Book

The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics
(Oxford University Press, 2013; paperback October 2015.)
Preview: Oxford Scholarship Online ¦ Google Books
Buy: OUP UK ¦ OUP USA ¦ Amazon UK ¦ Amazon US ¦ BookDepository
Reviews and critical notices: Journal of Moral Philosophy ¦ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews ¦ Times Literary Supplement ¦ Ethics ¦ Philosophical Quarterly ¦ Choice ¦ Disputatio


Papers

The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism  (pdf)
Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, ed. Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (Routledge).

Doubts about Moral Perception  (pdf)
Forthcoming in Evaluative Perception, ed. Anna Bergqvist and Robert Cowan (Oxford University Press).

Reasons and Moral Principles  (pdf)
Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford University Press).

Thick Ethical Concepts
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta.
(Current version URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thick-ethical-concepts/>)

Essential Contestability and Evaluation  (pdf)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2014), 471-88.
(Available at Taylor & Francis Online; requires institutional access.)

Shapelessness in Context  (pdf)
Noûs 48 (2014), 573-93.
(Available at Wiley Online Library; requires institutional access.)

Grounding and Normative Explanation  (pdf)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (2013), 155-78.
(Available at Wiley Online Library; requires institutional access.)

Thick Concepts and Underdetermination  (pdf)
In Thick Concepts, ed. Simon Kirchin (Oxford University Press, 2013), 136-60.

Thick Concepts: Where's Evaluation?  (pdf)
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 7, ed. R. Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2012), 235-70.

Moral Particularism  (pdf)
In Continuum Companion to Ethics, ed. Christian B. Miller (Continuum Press, 2011), 247-60.

Thick Concepts and Variability  (pdf)
Philosophers' Imprint vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan. 2011). (Open access!)

A Wrong Turn to Reasons?  (pdf)
In New Waves in Metaethics, ed. Michael Brady (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 185-207.

Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials  (pdf)
Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009), 439-69.
(Available at Wiley Online Library; requires institutional access.)

Normative Appeals to the Natural   (pdf)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (Sept. 2009), 279-314.
(Available at Wiley Online Library; requires institutional access.)

A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles  (pdf)
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4, ed. R. Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2009), 91-132.

Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin   (pdf)
Philosophical Papers 37 (Nov. 2008), 389-412. (Special issue: Epistemology Through Thick & Thin).
(Available at Taylor & Francis Online; requires institutional access.)

Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism   (pdf)
Philosophical Quarterly 58 (July 2008), 489-511.
(Available at Wiley Online Library; requires institutional access.)

Usable Moral Principles   (pdf)
In Challenging Moral Particularism, ed. M. Lance, M. Potrc, and V. Strahovnik (Routledge, 2008), 75-106.

Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation   (pdf)
Ethics 116 (July 2006), 707-41.
(Available at Ethics Online; requires institutional access.)

Ethical Theories and Moral Guidance   (pdf)
Utilitas 18 (Sept. 2006), 291-309.
(The published version posted here with the publisher's permission. Also available at Cambridge Journals Online; requires institutional access.)

Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value   (pdf)
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 1, ed. R. Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2006), 295-324.

For a full list of publications, see my CV.