"collective Talleyrand" (p. 26) and gain more freedom of action than their compatriots elsewhere.

But the attempt to recapture the cultural ferment of Weimar was precisely the problem according to Schivelbusch. After 1930, intellectual life in Berlin began to fracture and lose steam, so that what the Nazis inherited in 1933 "was no longer the laboratory of modernity but merely the burned-out husk of the period 1918–29" (p. 13). Intellectuals yearning to return to 1933 began from the wrong starting point. A second problem was that the Russians, who controlled the city for two months before sharing power, seized the cultural initiative and never relinquished it. They, and sympathetic leftist Germans, set up cultural institutions in Berlin that provided support for cultural producers and granted crucial initial access to what remained of the printing presses, theaters, soundstages, and radio equipment.

The most interesting chapter examines the Kulturbund zur Demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands (Cultural Alliance for the Democratic Renewal of Germany). Although initially set up by the Russians, Kulturbund president and KPD member Johannes Becher followed a middle, conciliatory course. His desire to replace politics with culture struck a chord with the educated middle class, despite the organization’s leftist origins. Such a move attempted to overcome the political fractures of the 1930s and reunify Germans of disparate political stripes under the single banner of culture (pp. 80–84). However, the politics of the Cold War soon made the project irrelevant.

Schivelbusch is at his best unraveling the complex personal relationships underlying postwar cultural developments in Berlin, which he does on the strength of archival research in a wide range of personal correspondence. This is a refreshing change from comparable accounts which rely on official military government documents, and overstress the bureaucratic intricacies of occupation. Schivelbusch is also unafraid to speculate on the psychological drives of some of his protagonists. Such insights will probably be more interesting to specialists or a cultured German audience familiar with the names than to a more general audience. Unfortunately, his devotion to these personal conflicts also often supplants an analysis of the wider meanings of these developments. Marked by occasional sharp insights but lacking a wider field of a vision, In a Cold Crater supplements, but does not really supplant, comparable existing work.

Reviewed by CRAIG K. PEPPIN, who is finishing his Ph.D. in Intellectual History at Duke University.
volume thus belongs to a second genre as well, the interdisciplinary state-of-the-art report on evolutionism. Past reports have become indispensable for historians. We can be grateful in advance for this snapshot of mid-1990s evolutionary thinking.

Like the lectures they memorialize, the chapters in *Evolution* offer excellent value for the intellectual tourist. The authors are big names, the writing is fluent, the material is fascinating. We begin with biology. Looking especially at Robert Boyle in the seventeenth century and Charles Darwin in the nineteenth century, Stephen Jay Gould warns, again, of the perils of assuming good design in organisms without good evidence. Lewis Wolpert follows with a Darwinian scenario for the evolution of cells capable of creating the complex, apparently well-designed organisms that Darwin and the natural theologians before him so admired. Jared Diamond turns to biogeography, in particular the uneven distribution of domesticable plants and animals around the world, to explain why Eurasians first acquired guns, germs, steel, horses, and other conquest-enabling features of complex civilization. (Diamond has since elaborated his argument into a prize-winning book.)

The next three chapters are more of a grab-bag: the architect Richard Rogers on London as an evolving city; the anthropologist Tim Ingold on conceptualizing humankind’s place in nature; and the literary critic Gillian Beer on the novel’s exploration of evolutionary themes. Those interested in the behavioral and social sciences will especially value Ingold’s concise statement of his critique of the divide underwriting anthropological practice in much of the twentieth century—roughly, a divide between evolution, nature, and nonhuman creatures on one side, and history, culture, and human creatures on the other side. Along the way, Ingold provides much insight into the history of this divide, from the Enlightenment to the present.

The volume closes with two chapters on astronomy and cosmology. Freeman Dyson illustrates speciation and symbiosis in the heavens, on the earth, and in the sciences. He makes an interesting case for the importance of symbiosis between sciences and tools from outside those sciences. (Readers hungry for history of science should head straight for Dyson, Ingold, and Gould.) Finally, Martin Rees discusses different beliefs about how our universe began, how it will end, and why the fundamental constants in our laws of nature should be just the values needed for the emergence of complex structures such as stars and organisms. I say ‘our’ universe and ‘our’ laws of nature, because Rees suggests that there are many universes, and that we inhabit the one which happened to have the congenial constants.

What, on the evidence of this collection, will the historian of the future conclude about fin-de-siècle evolutionary thinking? Most striking, perhaps, is a preoccupation with individual development, and the need to rethink the relations between development in the individual and evolution in the species. The enormous ferment in developmental biology over the last 20 years appears to be bubbling over into evolutionary biology. Thus Gould and Wolpert argue that the developmental program, encoded in the genes, supplies the constraints within which natural selection operates. For Diamond, these programs likewise constrain would-be plant and animal breeders. For Ingold, the nature/culture divide breaks down when we rightly conceive creatures, humans included, as packages of abilities that develop according to contexts shaped through the actions of ancestors.

Outside these chapters, undercurrents of developmentalism and saltationism—the two have often gone together (think of Richard Goldschmidt’s ‘hopeful monsters’)—occasionally surface. Rogers writes of London undergoing “a sequence of periods of concerted growth and radical change that parallels the evolutionary cycle of living organisms” (p. 67). Dyson likens speciation to sudden phase transitions, and celebrates symbiosis as enabling structural leaps in one go. Beer reminds us that novelists were concerned from early days with relations between the growing individual and the evolving species.
It remains to be seen whether this broad interest in bringing together ontogeny and phylogeny prefigures things to come. For the time being, however, *Evolution* gives us an intriguing glimpse of one—and, in Rees’s chapter, vastly more than one—possible world.

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Of immediate interest to specialists in mass communications research, this book also shows how well-positioned historians of the social sciences are to enter conversations usually dominated by scholars of politics, law, and government. By exploring how a tiny intellectual elite navigated the treacherous geography of propaganda in war and peace, *Nervous Liberals* tells several big stories about social scientific knowledge in action.

Brett Gary contends that obsessive propaganda analysis was central to liberalism’s journey from an optimistic ideology of mass participation to a skeptical ideology of expert administration, and that propaganda consciousness simultaneously reoriented liberalism from the defense of citizens’ civil liberties to the defense of state security. He places propaganda scholarship at the center of shifting theories of the First Amendment, since the doubts intellectuals expressed that propaganda was “only words” provoked legal theorists to vacillate between restricting and protecting speech on the assumption that even experts were befuddled by the line between language and behavior. Finally, he argues that the national security state was founded on propaganda anxieties, and that the constellation of defense-oriented bureaucracies and priorities identified with the era after 1945 originated much earlier in time. Between 1917 and 1945, liberal social scientists created a rationale that elevated government’s mandate to eradicate internal enemies over its obligation to protect individual and collective rights to expression. “Nervous liberals” diminished the meaning of freedom and, Gary implies, were largely responsible for the severely constricted political culture of the Cold War at home.

The context for this profound alteration was the dawn of a modern era of applied psychology. For numerous intellectuals, emerging industries in public relations, advertising, and personnel management revealed the appalling susceptibility of ordinary people to emotional persuasion, making rational decision-making unlikely or even impossible and undermining the critical capacities on which self-government rested. Suspicious that the same techniques used to peddle soap might make invidious ideas all too palatable, propaganda analysts set out to salvage democracy in an age of sophisticated psychological manipulation.

The scholars whose work Gary highlights retreated sharply from democratic idealism after World War I to embrace a chastened but determined realism. Their proposals for propaganda prophylaxis posited a viral theory in which Americans were helpless against the onslaught of evil fascist and communist ideas. Since citizens could not be trusted to simultaneously tolerate and defend themselves against these ideas—which is what democracy...